NEW YORK TIMES DATE 20 Sept 70 PAGE 19

Dangers of Background Briefing Underlined for Nixon Last Week

By HEDRICK SMITH
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 18 — The background briefing has long been establishd, if controversial, way for Administrations to convey conformation, but occasionaly it backfires, as it did this week for President Nixon.

The advantage to this method, is that since the samce is anonymous the words can later be disavowed if policy or events so dictate.

But when the samice becomes known the disavowal becomes all but impossible. This is what happened in the last 48 hours to Mr. Nixon's private comments about the circumstances of possible American intervention in the Jordanian crisis.

The Chicago Sun-Times reported in its early editions of Friday that the United States was prepared to intervene in Jordan if Syria and Iraq entered the conflict.

The White House seemed embarrassed, not so much that the gist of the President's comments had been published by The Sun-Times, but that the article indicated clearly that the President was the source, at though his name was hot mentioned.

The events, as pieced together from White House sources and members of The Sun-Times staff, went as follows:

On Thursday, during his trip to Chicago, Mr. Nixon held two private background briefings, one for the Chicago Sun-Times and The Chicago Daily News, the other for The Chicago Tribune and Chicago Today.

Difference of Opinion

The Sun-Times printed an article on the President's assessment of the Middle East, interpreting his briefing as what is known among reporters as a "deep backgrounder." This means the material is usable on the newspaper's own authority, but is not for attribution to the President or any other official. The other newspaper editors regarded the president's remarks as "off the record," that is, not for publication.

Sun-Times officials privately said that the President explicitly encouraged them to take notes after they had initially held back, and that he had also said he was giving them material for use in editorials, columns and background articles.

The Sun-Times carried its article in its first Friday editions, actually published Thursday evening. Almost immediately, the White House party, in flight from Chicago to Washington, received word and White House officials spoke with Sun-Times editors.

Ronald L. Ziegler, the White House press secretary, acknowledged today that he and Herbert G. Klein, the President's director of communications, had talked with The Sun-Times about the general rules for the President's briefing. But Sun-Times officials said at no time had the White House seemed angered or asked that the article be dropped.

Chaped in Later Editions

After the White House intercession, however, James F Hoge Jr., the Sun-Times editor said he decided to have the information from the controversial story put together with other stories on the Jordanian crisis to provide a "more lucid and logical explanation" of the situation. The net effort was to bury the President's remarks and more effectively blur their authorship in later editions.

But by then the Washington Post had picked up the essence of the Sun-Times article, noting that it had been printed immediately after a briefing from the President—leaving no doubt about the source of the comments.

Most reporters considered it significant that the White House had not seemed deeply perturbed by the article an indication that the President was evidently not unhappy about them. Some newsmen speculated that this was precisely what he had intended.

Kissinger Gives Briefing

Twice previously in recent weeks the Middle East has been the topic of similar briefings. On June 30, Henry A. Kissinger, the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs, said one objective of American policy in the region was to "expel" Soviet military personnel from Egypt.

When that was given prminent press display and after Mr. Kissinger had been identified plained that he had not meant to imply an armed American intervention, but rather a diplomatic effort to make [illegible] and thereby make the Soviet military [illegible] unnecessary.

EDITORIAL

Not For Attribution

The Anatomy of a 'Backgrounder' With the President

Richard Harwood

On Thursday morning at 10 a.m. President Nixon drove up to the handsome building on North Wabash Avenue that houses the Chicago Sun-Times and the Chicago Daily News. He stopped in the lobby to look at a plaque that said: "Our newspapers have one duty above and beyond all others: to find and portray the truth."

Then he took an elevator to the seventh floor where, in the corporation's board room, he drank tomato juice and coffee for nearly two hours while he expounded on the state of the world. His audience included all of the principal executives of the two newspapers, including Bailey Howard, the president of the parent corporation, Field Enterprises. Out of that meeting came an ambiquous report to the effect that the United States was "prepared to intervene" in the internal conflict in Jordan. That report was later to appear in The Washington Post.

Richard Harwood is an assistant managing editor of The Washington Post. He will be writing in this space from time to time on problems and controversies in news coverage.

Whether the President made that statement is now in dispute. The context in which he may or may not have made it is in dispute. Whether it should or should not have been published under the "ground rules" of the meeting is in dispute. But it produced one of the most curious journalistic reactions on record and raised some very basic questions about the responsibilities and competence of Presidents and newspapermen.

Roy Fisher, the editor of the Daily News, was at the luncheon. He got the impression, he later said, that the President was going to talk on a "deep background" basis which, in the jargon of this business, seems to mean that whatever a public official says for "deep background" may be published but without attribution to anyone.

Any confusion over the "ground rules", however, presumably was cleared up at the outset, said Fisher, by the senior newspaper executive present, Bailey Howard, who told the President: ". . . We're going to handle this off-the-record today." That meant that nothing Mr. Nixon might say would be published in any form; it would be a completely private discussion.

"The President smiled," Fisher recalled, "and said that would be satisfactory." Nearly two hours later, the meeting came to an end. The President went on to other meetings—including a late afternoon "backgrounder" with executives of the Chicago Tribune and Chicago Today.

The Daily News people went about the task of putting out two more editions that afternoon. Fisher left orders that nothing the President had said during the morning should be printed and those orders were followed. Fisher left his office at 4:45 p.m. and a little while later got a shock.

The first edition of the Sun-Times — a "morning" paper—hit the streets at 5:05 p.m. and it carried a banner headline:

"U. S. ready to act
to save Jordan king"

The story was written by David Murray, a Sun-Times reporter who had been at the luncheon, and it said that "The United States is prepared to intervene directly in the Jordanian civil war should Syria and Iraq enter the conflict and tip the military balance against the government forces loyal to King Hussein, the Sun-Times learned Thursday."

Learned from whom? The story didn't say but the source was obvious from other material in the Sun-Times. A story on page two described Mr. Nixon's visit to the newspapers and said he "discussed domestic and foreign policies, particularly the Middle East, and economic questions." Another story on page three also referred to the visit and a picture on the same page showed the President in the board room with his hosts.

Fisher of the Daily News was "astonished" at the Sun-Times story and "thought they had violated the rules." The editor of the Sun-Times, James Hoge, ordered the Murray story printed and insists that "we didn't violate any ground rules." The President, he said, was not speaking "off-the-record"; he was merely speaking on the basis of "no attribution."

So you have a basic conflict to begin with over a very simple and elementary fact. Was or was not the President speaking "off-the-record"? And it is not a conflict between two cub reporters. It is a conflict between the principal news executives of two major newspapers. That one is still not resolved.

A second conflict has arisen over what the President did or did not say and over the context in which he said it. It is Fisher's recollection that the President outlined several hypothetical "options" for U.S. policy in the Middle East, that one of those hypothetical "options" was direct intervention by the U.S., but that the President "immediately characterized it as undesirable and knocked it down."


Chicago Sun-Times CITY

U.S. ready to act to save Jordan king

First-edition headline in the Sun-Times . . .


Chicago Sun-Times FINAL

Hussein's armor hits rebels; U.S. action is possible

. . . and the front page after the "kill"

It is the recollection of people from the Sun-Times that the President did not outline several hypothetical options, that the only option he mentioned was intervention, and that he suggested that the papers might want to print the fact that intervention was under consideration. So you have another conflict over the basic facts of the meeting. The two newspapers cannot even agree on what the President said or how he said it.

Subsequent events on Thursday night did nothing to clarify the situation or to add to the credibility of either the press or the administration.

A couple of hours after the first edition of the Sun-Times appeared, Edward Weintal, a former Newsweek diplomatic correspondent now at the U.S. Information Agency, got a call from Chicago about the Sun-Times story. He notified the agency's director, Frank Shakespeare, and alerted the Voice of America to be prepared to broadcast the story around the world. Shakespeare evidently did some checking of his own because he appeared at a reception at about 8 p.m. and told a reporter for The Washington Star that the United States "might intervene" if "Iraq and Syria move" against the Jordanians. A reporter from The Washington Post was also at the reception but missed Shakespeare's remarks. Score one for The Star.

Before the night was out, Shakespeare was to "disassociate" himself from the statement he made at the reception. But before that happened U.S.I.A.—at about 9 p.m.—had called The Post to find out how the Sun-Times story was being handled. That was the first news The Post had of the Sun-Times story. And there is an explanation for that. The wire services—the Associated Press and United Press International—routinely pick up through their regional bureaus major stories that appear in the daily newspapers. The Sun-Times story—"U.S. ready to act"—was promptly picked up by both the UPI and AP bureaus in Chicago. They notified their Washington and New York offices and asked for instructions. At about the same time, however, Sun-Times news executives were calling the wire services in Chicago to "kill" the intervention story and to "plead" that it not be put out across the country to AP and UPI subscribers.

"They (the Sun-Times) said an 'incredible blunder' had been made," according to Marvin Arrowsmith, chief of the AP's Washington Bureau. On the basis of these calls from the Sun-Times, both AP and UPI "killed" the story. And the Sun-Times killed it, too, in its later editions. As a substitute, it inserted a generalized story about the Middle East, based on comments from the State Department and the Pentagon. The story was written in Chicago. But it carried a Washington date line and the label: "Special to The Sun-Times". Nevertheless, the Voice of America put the story on the air and broadcast it to the world. The Post checked out the original Sun-Times story, concluded that the President had made a statement about "intervention," and decided to print it.

By that time, calls were coming in to The Post from Sun-Times editors who said they "no longer stand behind the story" and "disassociate (the Sun-Times) completely" from it.

What was that all about? Editor Hoge of the Sun-Times had this explanation: Before leaving Chicago at about 7:30 p.m. the President's staff had learned of the Sun-Times story. After they were airborne in the President's plane, they placed calls to a Sun-Times executive, who talked to the President's press secretary, Ronald Ziegler, and to the administration's communications director, Herbert Klein. The discussion, said Hoge, had to do with the ground rules of the morning meeting at the newspaper office. "It was a very low key discussion," said Hoge. "At no time did anyone (from the White House) request that we kill the story."

Why was it killed then? Hoge's answer to that one is that it really wasn't killed, that the paper merely put together a more "lucid and logical" explanation of what was going on in the Middle East.

The fact is, however, that the key language in the earlier story—"prepared to intervene directly in the Jordanian civil war"—does not appear in the later story. The further fact is that the Sun-Times took extraordinary steps to keep the story off the wires and to emphasize that it no longer "stood behind it."

There are two obvious points to be made about all this. The first is that newspapers are terribly fallible institutions that sometimes do their job so badly that they cannot even agree on the simplest facts. The second is that "background" sessions can be the worst possible forums for the propagation of foreign policy, especially in explosive situations such as prevail in the Mideast. Nobody's "credibility" was enhanced by the Chicago episode—not the credibility of the government and not the credibility of the press which is constantly taking public officials to task for double-talk.

Did the President on Thursday morning threaten to intervene in Jordan? Or did a major American newspaper distort and misrepresent what he said? When people who heard him in Chicago are unable to agree on such a simple fact as that, it makes you wonder what you *can* believe in the newspapers.

Russians and Chinese Continue Wide Military Build-up Along Disputed Border

By WILLIAM BEECHER
Special to The New York Times

HONG KONG, July 21 — The Soviet Union and Communist China, nervously eyeing each other across their disputed 4,500-mile border, have taken a number of dramatic steps in their military build-up, according to well-placed analysts of Far Eastern intelligence here and in Washington.

According to these senior Western analysts, the Russian build-up in particular has long since passed the point of mere ability to defend against any Chinese thrust and has placed the Russians in a position to take offensive action, either conventional or nuclear.

"And the build-up on the Russian side shows no sign of stopping," one intelligence official said.

Reviewing developments along the frontier, the analysts also cited these developments:

¶Emplacement of "many hundreds" of tactical nuclear missiles and rockets by the Soviet Union along the border, including the first deployment of a new solid-fuel mobile missile known to Western analysts as Scaleboard. This missile is mounted on a tank chassis, has an estimated range of 500 miles and packs a warhead of over one megaton, the equivalent of a million tons of TNT.

¶A build-up of Soviet conventional forces of least 35 combat-ready divisions with a capability of rapid reinforcement by air and rail with an additional 25 divisions.

¶Recent construction of a new Chinese missile-testing complex in the general vicinity of Peking from which the Chinese are expected soon to test fire a two-stage liquid-fuel missile as much as 1,500 to 2,000 miles into the Sinkiang autonomous region in the west. A version of this weapon was used three months ago to loft a 381-pound satellite into space. Some analysts suggest China is now in a position—in an emergency—to fire a [illegible] missiles, with [illegible] from the new [illegible] as well as from [illegible] pads in west-central China.

¶A rapid reinforcement over the last year of Chinese paramilitary units along the northern border in a strength now estimated at two million men. The Chinese have also upgraded the arms and training of border militia units and moved several hundred thousand regular army troops to positions closer to, but still to the rear of, these lightly armed frontier units.

¶Division of Inner Mongolia, which borders Soviet-aligned Mongolian People's Republic, into three parts, with the Inner Mongolia military region being absorbed by the Lanchow, Peking and Shenyang military regions. Instead of a shallow, elongated defensive position, the Chinese thereby are enabled to defend these natural invasion corridors in depth.

Border Talks Continue

The Chinese and Soviet build-ups were accelerated last year after a series of border clashes. Since October, 1969, the two sides have been holding border negotiations in Peking. Although no progress has been reported in these talks, no further clashes have been publicized by either side and the level of polemics has been toned down. The two countries are reported to have agreed recently to an exchange of ambassadors.

Some analysts, stressing the seriousness with which they take the Soviet activity, point out that besides making the first deployment of the potent Scaleboard missile along the China front, the Russians have added a fourth company to each of their Frog nuclear rocket battalions in the Far East. In Europe, such battalions have only three companies. The Frog is a tactical rocket with a range of about 30 miles.

The analysts point out also that the Russians have expanded existing border air bases and, interestingly, constructed "several dozen" new landing strips that remain unoccupied. If necessary, they say, these strips could be used for a very speedy build-up, as well as serve as dispersed emergency strips for jet fighters and bombers.

Knowledgeable officials say that until Peking launched its first space satellite in late April, it was believed the two-stage missile the Chinese had been testing for years had a range of 600 and 1,000 miles. Now experts believe the Chinese missile's range is between 1,500 and 2,000 miles.

The officials say they believe China will soon test its first intercontinental ballistic missile—with an estimated range of 6,000 miles—probably by adding a third stage to the booster used in the space shot.

Peking is believed to be very eager to develop long-range missiles in order to better deter a possible Soviet attack, as well as to support a claim to superpower status, alongside the United States and the Soviet Union.



The New York Times July 22, 1970

Diagonal shading indicates regions of China along border with the Soviet Union and Mongolia, an ally of Moscow.

SUNDAY STAR DATE [illegible] PAGE [illegible]

A Scientist Pleads for the Abolition of Secrecy

By EDWARD TELLER

There is evidence that Russia is able to obtain virtually any information she desires from the United States—including secret defense information. It is equally evident that Russia's tight security cloak has effectively blocked our access to Russian security information.

The immediate reaction by many is that we should strengthen and enforce security measures. In my opinion, this would be a mistake.

Security is probably not protecting our "secrets" because the Russians possess a very sophisticated police state intelligence apparatus. In this respect we cannot match them. As a democracy we should not attempt to do so.

It would be a sad day if we matched the Russians by building up a secret police force of 2,000,000 men—occupying many high positions in all walks of life, ranging across the entire economic and political spectrum. We should work in the opposite direction: we should reduce the restrictions of secrecy as completely and as rapidly as possible.

A quarter-century of experience should have taught us that a democracy cannot function effectively under a cloak of secrecy; that secrecy impedes the flow and exchange of knowledge and dampens the productivity of scientific research. In contrast, a dictatorship can keep secrets by exercising strict control over human freedom of communication and movement. It is their normal order of society, and their scientists are adapted to a repressive environment.

Secret research is generally abhorred by our scientists, many of whom cannot, and will not work under security restrictions that block open discussion and the free flow and exchange of ideas between scientists. Russian scientists do not like secrecy any more than we do. But most of them do not even dare to make any suggestion.

In developing nuclear weapons we practiced secrecy and lost the leadership that we will not be able to regain for years to come. By contrast, in the case of nuclear reactors, the removal of secrecy in 1955 resulted in the achievement of economical nuclear power a dozen years later. In this respect we are the best in the world.

In electronic computers even more remarkable results have been obtained by open competition and no fetters of "security." We are so far ahead of all of our competitors that even if they had a sample of each of our computers (which they don't), they would not be able to duplicate our progress; the same is true of solid state electronics.

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I wish we could say the same with equal confidence concerning the development of nuclear weapons—which is secret.

Our policy of secrecy has been successful only in confusing the discussions of preparedness in our country.

We are in real ignorance of the advances Russia has made in the development of nuclear explosives, and our public is poorly informed regarding the developing strength of Russian nuclear arms.

The weight that Soviet missiles can carry to the United States is today several times as great as the weight we can deliver against Russia. In order to make vital decisions regarding defense, the public should be realistically and accurately informed. It is not.

But secrecy has become in the first part of the sixties a political tool to shield our leaders from criticism. For quite a few years it has been known that the Russians are rapidly expanding their nuclear capability. The facts of this deployment were not publicly emphasized and most of the relevant points were actually kept secret. Thus, the American people were unaware of a developing danger. Fortunately, this policy has been reversed by Secretary Laird.

Factual information, known to the Russians and our own government, is withheld from the public by "security" restrictions. The public is denied the vital information that is essential background to critical decisions. An uninformed public creates as dangerous a situation as a misinformed public.

And it is a paradox that we have vast stores of information, all of which is highly secret from the public and not clearly understood by authorized members of Congress, while the Russians can and do obtain this same secret information.

It might be argued that the atom bomb — the biggest, most complex and completely



—Associated Press

DR. EDWARD TELLER

successful scientific project of all time — was developed in complete secrecy. It was, but under that tight envelope of war-time secrecy, our scientists, military and politicians cooperated closely for national survival. At that time, secrecy was the barrier between two warring nations. Under those conditions, secrecy did not isolate the scientific, military and political communities from each other. They worked together. Nevertheless the Russians penetrated that area before the end of World War II.

After World War II, our best scientists returned to the universities, and the freedom of unclassified research. Meanwhile, the military concept of secrecy — "the cloak and dagger syndrome" — has persisted.

The news media, when reporting our strength in terms of numbers of weapons, do not know what they are talking about.

There is a popular misconception that the world is involved in an arms race in the classical sense of the word. This is not so. It is rather a race in technological discovery, closely coupled with research in applied science.

This race works in secrecy — real secrecy on the part of the Russians; pretended secrecy on the part of the United States.

The classical concept of the arms race was to compare, for instance, the number of battleships. Today we compare the numbers of atomic warheads and we imagine we know what we are talking about. But we do not. The nuclear warheads differ in power, a hundredfold or a thousandfold. They differ in function, in purpose, in sensitivity to defense measures. Actually, the situation is even more complicated. What counts are the weapons that could be created by research on defense: it is the race of ideas and the implementation of these ideas.

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Our universities have been a splendid source of ideas. They also have prepared a small fraction of the students for research work on national defense as a career. Today our students in our foremost universities are indoctrinated against any such activity. The change was initiated in March 1969 at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The demand was raised to exclude from the university all work related to national defense. In the last few months even more radical steps have been proposed. It is suggested that those working on national defense should be excluded from the scientific community. These demands are inflamed by offensive placards and demonstrations at scientific meetings.

The movement has spread to many institutions, including most of our leading universities. Our academic community is being separated in a most effective manner from those who are trying to apply research to the defense of our country.

I am sure that the March 4 movement at MIT was not organized by the Kremlin. But had it been so organized it could not have been more helpful to the Russian Communist's dream of world domination.

* * * *

Meanwhile, our highly sophisticated, technological defense establishment is advancing the state-of-theart weaponry into new and therefore secret areas. They are encountering problems of extreme complexity, and need the brain power of our best scientists. But the work is secret, and our best scientists do not want to engage in secret work. Therefore, the gap widens.

There is an urgent need to heal the breach between the academic world and those who work on the defense of our country. A revision of our security rules would be an important step in this direction.

Ever since alchemy expired, which was not so very long ago, openness was the first commandment of science. It came even before truth, because without openness, truth cannot be found.

During the difficult period of the Second World War, the commandment of openness was violated. It was replaced with secrecy. It might be argued that under the cloak of secrecy the alchemists' dream, transmutation of elements, was actually accomplished.

To put the development of our present attitude towards maintaining a fiction of secrecy, we should review its development.

Around 1900 no important secrets existed in military technology. The arms race was something visible, something that could be seen and understood. The great unknown was the way in which forces would be employed in an actual war. Strategy and tactics remained unpredictable. Thus uncertainty, rather than secrecy, sufficed to confound every prediction concerning the course of World War I.

Technological secrets scarcely existed in this country between the two World Wars, but most of the vast scientific and technical progress of the 1940-45 era was shielded by wartime secrecy, much of which was declassified after peace treaties were signed.

But after 1945 secrecy became a permanent fixture of our policy and administrative practice. We called this policy of secrecy "security."

It would be a mistake to believe that Russian spies had no effect on history. True, nobody knows to what extent the knowledge handed over to Moscow accelerated development of the Russian atomic bomb. My guess is that Russian scientists could have performed the task just as quickly without any inside information. Once Horoshima demonstrated the atomic explosives would work, a competent and well supported group of scientists could reproduce the result without excessive difficulty.

But Stalin was not a trusting soul. One can hardly believe that he would have placed complete confidence in his scientists when they claimed to understand atomic explosions and their feasibility. However, when Russian intelligence delivered the American atomic bomb secrets he had a complete set of independent data, and was able to move ahead on the correct project with great confidence.

On a number of occasions our negotiations with Russia on arms control failed because they already knew our atomic secrets. The first failure was the Baruch Plan, a few months after Hiroshima. We were offering them a "bargain." We wanted international control and the security such control would create. In exchange we offered our atomic secrets.

Actually, our secrets had been passed on to the Russians by an excellent scientist, Klaus Fuchs, who worked in Los Alamos during the war, and by an independent group of agents, the Rosenbergs and their associates.

Therefore, when we offered our secrets in the Baruch Plan, we were actually offering nothing. Stalin summarily rejected our proposals and the negotiations folded.

Our next attempt toward a policy of openness was made in 1954. We proposed the "Open Skies Policy," with freedom of international inspection. Russia answered "Nyet."

In 1958 we returned to the conference table and agreed with the Russians to place a moratorium on all nuclear tests.

This example should have sufficed to alert us to a peculiar fact: secrecy did not permit the discussion of the issue which turned out to be one of the most relevant results of future tests under discussion.

In 1961, after only three years, Russia broke the moratorium in a surprise move. We had claimed that our intelligence would detect any preparation for nuclear testing on a big scale in Russia. Unfortunately, we were caught by surprise.

In 1961 and 1962 there was a concentrated effort to perform atomic tests, both in Russia and in the United States. The Russian tests were numerous and well planned. The American tests were fewer and performed on the basis of improvisation.

At that time both sides began to pay attention to the possibility of ballistic missile defense. Ironically, in forthcoming negotiations on a partial test ban, the question of ballistic missile defense was not even discussed. This, in spite of the fact that perhaps the main result of these tests was connected with such a defense.

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The agreement to stop nuclear atmospheric tests in 1962 has been called the first step on the long road toward a stable and peaceful world. In the meantime, underground tests were going on in both the United States and Russia. As long as the Russian tests were carried out in the atmosphere we could assess their rate of progress. As soon as the tests went underground we could not make this evaluation. Therefore, one effect of the atmospheric test ban was to strengthen effective Russian secrecy.

Atmospheric tests are particularly well adapted to the exploration of the ways in which a nuclear explosion of appropriate size can destroy an incoming missile without inflicting damage on the ground. Thus, our agreement to stop atmospheric tests has guaranteed that the Russians will have permanent superiority gained in 1961-62, in the knowledge of missile defense.

The possibilities of missile defense have been loudly discussed. But the discussions consistently stopped at the brink of technological secrecy. The potential use of nuclear arms in destroying cities is understood, but the most important details of the delivery system are classified secret.

The sad fact is that the secrets which we are trying to keep are in all probability known to the Russians.

It is lamentable that at present our government is much further from an open policy than our highly competitive industry.

We should attempt to be as open — unfettered by secrecy — as possible. Without openness no conference on disarmament or arms control can produce results. But once the policy of openness is adopted in the United States and hopefully, in the whole free world, Russia will feel the pressure and may gradually open up. If that happens it will become possible not only to discuss arms in a more meaningful manner — we will also be able to approach real understanding. The sharp difference between free societies and the communist police states will diminish.

The difference between East and West has deep roots in the past. Peace, freedom and stability will not be brought about by any single conference or by rapid political change. But the spirit of openness is a powerful and necessary tool if we want to find the means to create some order in our shrinking world in which dangers and opportunities multiply with an ever increasing speed.

One can, of course, argue that we should discuss a secret development with the Russians at the conference table in Vienna without exposing the secrets to other nations. Such a procedure would have two unfortunate consequences. The first that we would have no way of checking whether the Russians were indeed opening up their secrets.

* * * *

The second and more serious result would be a feeling of utter dismay in the NATO alliance. To talk with the Russians on such subjects which we do not discuss with our allies would be tantamount to depriving the Western Alliance of its last claim to honesty and strength.

In practical terms it is impossible for the United States to open up all secrets. Some tactical secrets will have to be kept, but one may give serious consideration to a regulation whereby classified information will automatically be published after a limited period of time, for instance, after one year. This will effectively open up research and it will give pause to those who would use secrecy for purely political advantage. It may also pave the way toward a real agreement with our Russian proponents.

To observe the growth of nuclear arms should be an obligation. Today it is called spying. We should publish as much of the relevant details of all information concerning Russia as ever possible.

In the end, a policy of openness will probably lead to faster progress in our country. The sad fact is that secrecy works in reverse to what our public believes: our position is weakened and our adversary is strengthened. The underlying reason is that secrecy does not, and cannot, work in a democracy.

The Author

Edward Teller was born in Budapest, Hungary, in 1908. Schooled in the German tradition, he capped his education with a PhD degree from the University of Leipzig in 1930. He is one of the scientists whose immigration to the U.S. in the 1930s contributed abundantly to our knowledge of nuclear science at a time of great need and peril. An imposing list of honorary degrees and awards attests to his accomplishments. Some of them are: Einstein Award 1959, Living Historian Award 1960 and Fermi Award in 1962.

Professor Teller joined the secret Atomic Bomb project at the University of Chicago in 1942 and, later was a key scientist, at the Los Alamos Laboratory.

In the late 1940s when President Truman decided that the hydrogen bomb should be built — but no scientist knew how to do it — it was Teller who came up with the solution. It is unfortunate that this was the work for which he became known to the American people as the "Father of the H-Bomb"—a name he dislikes. Teller, both before and after, has had a number of more significant scientific discoveries to his credit. At the same time that he was working on the H-Bomb, Teller predicted the existence of "heavy mesons," which indeed were found 10 years later — a scientific feat which is known only to nuclear particle physicists.

In the course of this decade he has dedicated much time to "Project Plowshare"—the peaceful application of nuclear explosives for the opening up of new waterways, ports, sources of gas and oil. The project has run into strong controversy with environmentalists, and emotional opposition among campus radicals.

He is now professor at large at the University of California which enables him to teach on any subject on any of its campuses. He is also associate director of the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory.